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ABSTRACT. We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of
international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate
change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions,
we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs.
We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with
majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different
transfer schemes.
1. Introduction
For a long time, the classical approach to study participation in self-
enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) was based either
on the concept of the core (e.g. Chander and Tulkens, 1997), belonging
to cooperative game theory or on the concept of internal and external
stability (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993) belonging to non-cooperative
game theory (see Finus, 2003, for an overview). Non-cooperative game
theory models coalition formation as a two-stage game where players (e.g.
countries) decide upon their participation in the first stage and choose
their economic strategies (e.g. abatement levels) and possible transfers in
the second stage (see table 1). Typically, the game is solved by backward
induction.
In the second stage, the standard assumption is that players belonging
to the same coalition choose their economic strategies such as maximizing
the aggregate payoff to their coalition (i.e. joint welfare maximization). In the
case of heterogeneous players, sharing rules such as Nash bargaining and
Shapley value (Botteon and Carraro, 1997), or the Chander–Tulkens transfer
scheme (Barrett, 2001) have been applied. A particular set of assumptions
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Table 1. The structure of coalition formation∗
Stage Feature Specification
First stage:
participation
strategies
1. sequence simultaneous sequential
2. agreements single multiple
3. membership open exclusive
majority unanimity
Second stage:
economic and
transfer
strategies
4. economic
strategies
joint welfare
maximization
bargaining
5. transfer
strategies
no yes
classical
sharing
rules
optimal
sharing
rules
Note: ∗Standard assumptions are indicated in italics, assumptions considered in
this paper are indicated in bold, and assumptions that are proposed for future
research are underlined.
assigns a vector of payoffs to each coalition structure, called valuations. In
the first stage, the decision about participation is modeled as a membership
game. The standard assumption is a cartel formation game in which players
simultaneously announce their decision to remain a singleton or to join
the coalition (i.e. cartel). This assumption implies that players can only
form a single agreement. The standard definition of stability requires that in
equilibrium no player has an incentive to change its announcement. Hence,
this concept defines stability in terms of single deviations and implies open
membership since players can freely join a coalition.
Recently, there have been advances in non-cooperative coalition theory
that are gradually being adopted in the game theoretical analysis of
IEAs (e.g. Carraro, 2000; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). Until now, these
modifications apply exclusively to the first stage of coalition formation
(see table 1) and the definition of stable coalitions (not displayed in
table 1) as explained for instance in Finus (2003). Those modifications
include for instance that stability may be defined not only in terms of single
but also multiple deviations (e.g. strong Nash equilibrium or coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium). Moreover, the timing of participation decisions
may be modeled sequentially, the possibility of multiple coalitions can be
considered, as can be various forms of exclusive membership.
In this paper, we focus on the issues of ‘single versus multiple coalitions’
and ‘open versus exclusive membership’. From the theoretical oriented
literature, there is some indication that the formation of multiple coalitions
and the restriction of membership can enhance the success of self-enforcing
IEAs. However, this evidence is based on the assumption of symmetric
players and other restrictive assumptions about the payoff functions (e.g.
Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). In this paper,
we analyze these issues with an empirical model that comprises benefit and
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cost estimates for 12 heterogeneous world regions in the context of global
warming.1 This makes it interesting to analyze whether and how transfers
affect coalition formation.
In the following, we describe our model in section 2 and report our results
in section 3. In section 4, we place our conclusions in a wider perspective
and suggest issues for future research. This includes a discussion of all
assumptions listed in table 1 which are not treated in this paper.
2. The model
2.1 First stage of coalition formation
There are several ways to model the notion of single versus multiple
coalitions and open versus exclusive membership. We use a notion
proposed by Carraro (2000), which emerges as a natural extension of the
well-known concept of internal and external stability in the cartel formation
game. In the following, we describe this notion informally and provide a
formal definition in our working paper (Finus et al., 2004).
The notion of single versus multiple coalitions is modeled using two
alternative coalition games that both assume that all players {1, . . . ,n},
which are world regions in our model and henceforth referred to as
regions, simultaneously announce their membership. In the single coalition
game, regions have only two membership strategies, called announcements.
Announcement σi = 0 implies that the region remains a singleton and
announcement σi = 1 implies that the region becomes a member of a non-
trivial coalition, provided there is at least one more region that makes
the same announcement. In the multiple coalition game, regions have n
possible announcements. If a region makes an announcement that no other
region makes, this region remains a singleton. Regions that have made
the same announcement form a coalition. Consequently, in both games,
announcements lead to a coalition structure p = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κM}, which is a
partition of players in disjoint sets. In the single coalition game, κ2, . . . , κM
are singleton or trivial coalitions, whereas in the multiple coalition game,
some or all coalitions κ2, . . . , κM may be non-trivial coalitions.
The notion of open versus exclusive membership is captured by
applying different definitions of stability. In the single coalition game,
open membership is captured by the (standard) definition of internal and
external stability. A coalition structure p = {κ1, {i}, . . . , {k}} that is derived
from a set of announcements σ ∗ is stable if no region that announced σ ∗i = 1
has an incentive to change its announcement to σ ′i = 0 (internal stability)
and if no region that has announced σ ∗j = 0 has an incentive to change its
announcement to σ ′j = 1 (external stability). In order to capture exclusive
membership, we extend the definition of external stability under exclusive
1 For a similar procedure, see for instance Bosello et al. (2003) and Eyckmans and
Finus (2006).
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membership. In case a region that announced σ ∗j = 0 has an incentive to
switch to σ ∗j = 1, we assume that current members of coalition κ1 vote on the
accession of this region. We consider two versions: majority and unanimity
voting. Majority voting means that accession is only possible if a (strict)
majority of current members of coalition κ1 is in favor of accession (i.e. they
receive a higher payoff in the enlarged coalition). Under unanimity voting,
accession is only possible if all current members of κ1 support the accession
of a new member.
In the multiple coalition game, a coalition structure p = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κM}
is not only stable if the conditions for internal and external stability are
satisfied, but the conditions for intercoalitional stability must also hold.
That is, under open membership we also have to ensure that no coalition
member has an incentive to join another coalition. Exclusive membership
under majority and unanimity voting is captured in a similar way as
described for the single coalition game. That is, the definitions of exclusive
and intercoalitional stability are modified to account for the fact that if a
region has an incentive to join a coalition, current members vote upon its
accession.
There are two features that are important to note for the subsequent
analysis. Firstly, a coalition structure that is stable under open membership
will also be stable under exclusive membership (but not necessarily vice
versa) and a coalition structure that is stable under majority voting will
also be stable under unanimity voting (but not necessarily vice versa). This
is an immediate implication of the definitions of stability. The interesting
question is what ‘more stability’ means in terms of global abatement and
global welfare. Secondly, on the one hand, the possibility to form multiple
coalitions implies more flexibility for regions which might enhance the
success of coalition formation. For instance, a region that is not interested
in cooperation with the main coalition, as long as this means take it or
leave it, may consider forming another coalition with regions that have
similar interests. This may mean that this additional coalition implements
lower abatement targets but, nevertheless, its members increase abatement
above non-cooperative levels. On the other hand, however, more flexibility
means also more possibilities to free-ride. For instance, a coalition member
that is faced with the option to stay or to quit may decide to remain in the
coalition. However, having also the possibility to join another coalition may
be an attractive option, jeopardizing stability. Thus, the interesting question
is which of the two opposed effects is dominating.
In the context of symmetric players, it has been shown that if coalition
formation is not restricted to a single coalition, multiple coalitions will
emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, there is some indication that equilibrium
coalition structures in the multiple coalition game are superior in terms of
global abatement and global welfare than those in the single coalition game.
A similar positive impact applies also to exclusive membership (Carraro,
2000; Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). Hence, it
remains to be analyzed whether this also holds for heterogeneous players
for which we use our empirical model, as sensible analytical results are
difficult to obtain.
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2.2 The second stage of coalition formation
Basic structure
We assume that the payoff function of region i is given by
πi (q ) = Bi
⎛
⎝
n∑
j=1
q j
⎞
⎠− Ci (qi ), (1)
where Bi (
∑n
j=1 q j ) represents the benefits from global abatement (which
is the sum of individual abatement, q j , ∀ j ∈ I = {1, . . . ,n}) and Ci (qi )
are abatement costs from individual abatement qi, and q is the vector of
abatement levels. The strategy space is compact, qi ∈ [0, eBAUi ], where eBAUi
are business-as-usual emissions in the absence of any abatement. The benefit
function is a continuous and concave function and the cost function is a
continuous and strictly convex function. Each coalition κ l is assumed to
choose abatement such as maximizing the sum of payoffs of its individual
members2
max
qi , i∈κ
∑
i∈κ
πi (q ), (2)
given abatement qj of all players j /∈ κ. The simultaneous solution of (2) for
all coalitions κ in a given coalition structure p = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κM}, yields the
(unique) equilibrium abatement vector q ∗(p). This abatement vector can be
interpreted as a Nash equilibrium between coalitions. Within a coalition, the
abatement vector is optimal from a cost–benefit perspective of the coalition
members. Consequently, the coalition structure where all regions are in one
coalition (grand coalition), representing full cooperation, corresponds to the
global optimum. By the same token, the coalition structure that comprises
only singleton coalitions, representing no cooperation, corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium. Any other coalition structure may be seen as partial
cooperation.
In the case of no transfers, substituting q ∗(p) into (1) yields a vector of
payoffs π(q ∗(p)) = (π1(q ∗(p)), . . . , πN(q ∗(p))) called valuations, i.e. v(p) =
π(q ∗(p)). In the case of transfers, it is assumed that valuations may be
modified through a transfer scheme such that
vˆi (p) = vi (p) + ti , (3)
where ti > 0 means to receive a transfer and ti < 0 means to pay a transfer. In
addition, transfers are only paid among coalition members, these transfers
balance, i.e.
∑
j∈κ tj = 0, and hence
∑
j∈κ vj (p) =
∑
j∈κ vˆ j (p) holds.
3 We
assume transfers of the following form
ti = −vi (p) + vi (pN) + λi
⎡
⎣∑
j∈κ
vj (p) − vj (pN)
⎤
⎦ , (4)
2 This assumption is critically reviewed in section 4.
3 Hence, we make the simplifying but frequently encountered assumption of a TU-
framework. In the following, we use the term payoff and welfare interchangeably.
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where pN denotes the coalition structure comprising only singleton
coalitions, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium and p ∈ P denotes an
arbitrary coalition structure in the set of all coalition structures P. On
the right-hand side of the equality, the first two terms set every coalition
member back to its non-cooperative payoff that may be regarded as the
status quo before coalitions are formed. The third term allocates to each
member a portion of the gains from cooperation 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1,
∑
j∈κ λ j = 1,
measured as the difference between the aggregate payoff of coalition κl in
coalition structure p and the status quo coalition structure pN. Inserting (4)
in (3) gives
vˆi (p) = vi (pN) + λi
⎡
⎣∑
j∈κ
vj (p) − vj (pN)
⎤
⎦ . (5)
Equation (5) can be interpreted as a Nash bargaining solution with threat
points vi (pN) and weights λi , which allocates the collective gain of the
coalition κl over no cooperation, which is the term in brackets. In the game
theoretical literature, weights are typically interpreted as a reflection of
bargaining power (Binmore et al., 1986), whereas in the environmental
economics literature (Rose and Stevens, 1998; Rose et al., 1998) they are
typically associated with various notions of equity or fairness as described
below. For our analysis, the interpretation of weights is not important as
they are exogenous. In our discussion of policy issues, we restrict attention
to the dimension of equity and fairness, though it could also be related to
bargaining power.
Calibration of the payoff functions
The calibration of payoff function (1) is based on the stability of coalitions
(STACO) model. Since the model has been laid out in much detail in Dellink
et al. (2004), and frequently used for instance in Weikard et al. (2006), we
only briefly describe the main features. The philosophy behind STACO
comprises three items.
Firstly, the model should reflect important dynamics of climate models.
Therefore, STACO considers a period of 100 years, starting in 2010.
Secondly, in order to make the model interesting for a game theoretical
analysis, there should be a sufficient number of different players. Therefore,
STACO uses the abatement cost estimates of Ellerman and Decaux (1998),
for 12 world regions. For global and regional benefits from abatement (in
the form of reduced damages), it uses estimates of Fankhauser (1995) and
Tol (1997).
Thirdly, the model must be simple enough to be tractable for a game
theoretical analysis. Though STACO captures a time of 100 years, it
determines average abatement levels as if abatement were constant over
time. This is a simplification that neglects the equilibrium path of abatement
over time. However, this seems to be of minor importance as our analysis
computes stable coalition structures based on discounted payoffs, as this is
a common practice in the literature (see footnote 1). Important, however,
is that the parameters are calibrated such that they are in line with more
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sophisticated computable general equilibrium (CGE) models on climate
change in terms of global emissions after 100 years (e.g. Nordhaus and
Boyer, 2000; Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003). This is illustrated for the
benchmark global optimum in section 3. In our background paper, Dellink
et al. (2004), the details of this calibration are explained. Compared to
this paper (but also compared to the two papers mentioned above), we
use updated information on global benefits from Tol (2005), suggesting
much higher benefits. This is reflected in our global benefit parameter
b as explained below. The implications of this update for our results in
section 3 as well as the limitations of our model and alternative assumptions
will be discussed in section 4.
For a given discount rate, which we assume to be 2 per cent, we consider
the following discounted payoff function
πi (q ) = γi b
N∑
j=1
q j −
[ 1
3 · αi · q 3i + 12 · βi · q 2i
]
, (6)
with parameters as listed in the table in the appendix and where abatement
qi is the total abatement over 100 years from business-as-usual emissions
(BAU emissions). The global benefit parameter b can be interpreted as the
discounted global marginal benefit from full cooperation. The value of this
parameter was in the original calculations in STACO 37.4 US$ per ton of
carbon, in line with older estimates by Tol (1997), but has been updated to
77 US$, reflecting the newest insights by Tol (2005). The regional benefit
parameter is γi , representing the shares of the different world regions
in global benefits, where 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1,
∑N
j=1 γ j = 1; αi and βi are regional
abatement cost parameters that take on a non-negative value. The regional
parameters reflect the differences of 12 world regions: United States of
America (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EU), other OECD countries
(OOE), Eastern European countries (EE), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy
exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian
economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA), and ‘rest of the world’ (ROW).4 The
implications for the different benefit functions can be directly seen from
column 3 in the table in the appendix. The large industrialized regions (EU,
USA, and JPN) are the main beneficiaries of global abatement, whereas
energy-exporting countries (EEX), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil
(BRA), and Eastern European Countries (EE) receive the smallest shares of
global benefits. The implications for the different abatement cost functions
are more difficult to read from the table in the appendix and are displayed
in figure 1.
4 EU comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. OOE includes
among other countries Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. EE includes for
instance Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic. EEX includes for example the
Middle East Countries, Mexico, Venezuela, and Indonesia. DAE comprises South
Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. ROW includes for instance South
Africa, Morocco, and many countries in Latin America and Asia. For details, see
Babiker et al. (2001).
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Figure 1. Marginal abatement cost functions
It is evident that marginal abatement costs vary widely: China, USA,
India, and ROW have the flattest curves, whereas Brazil has the steepest,
followed by Japan. On average, regions that have low current BAU
emissions are costly abaters since further emission reduction is only possible
by employing expensive abatement technology. The opposite holds for
regions with high current BAU emission levels (see the table in the
appendix).
In case of transfers, we consider four different transfer schemes that
have played a prominent role in the literature on fair sharing rules in the
context of a global climate agreement (Rose et al., 1998, Rose and Stevens,
1998). In our context, these rules relate to the weight λi as explained above.
The larger this weight is, the larger is the share that a coalition member
receives from the gains of cooperation. The weights implied by the different
rules are displayed for the grand coalition in table 2. Therefore, values will
be different for other coalitions, though computations are straightforward
using the data in table 2.5 In the following, we only briefly comment on the
four rules and refer the reader to the literature mentioned above for a more
comprehensive motivation.
The transfer scheme ‘equal sharing’ implies in this context that each
participant receives the same weight. Given the fact that regions are in
many respects very heterogeneous, it is of course debatable whether equal
sharing really implies equal and fair treatment.
The transfer scheme ‘population’ acknowledges that all people should
benefit equally from cooperation: ‘one man one vote’. Energy exporting
5 Let the grand coalition be denoted by pG and the weights in table 2 be denoted by
λGi , then for any coalition κ weights λi are given by λi = λGi /
∑
j∈κ λ
G
i .
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Table 2. Weights of four transfer schemes∗
Equal
sharing Population Ability to pay
Gross
domestic
product
Regions 1#κm
POPi∑
j∈κm POPj
[GDPi /POPi ]−1∑
j∈κm [GDPj /POPj ]−1
GDPi∑
j∈κm GDPj
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USA 8.3 4.8 0.5 27.0
JPN 8.3 1.9 0.3 17.0
EU 8.3 5.8 0.6 29.2
OOE 8.3 2.2 1.1 5.8
EE 8.3 1.9 4.4 1.2
FSU 8.3 4.5 8.2 1.5
EEX 8.3 24.9 14.8 5.0
CHN 8.3 20.9 18.5 3.1
IND 8.3 17.8 37.0 1.4
DAE 8.3 3.2 3.2 3.0
BRA 8.3 3.0 3.6 2.4
ROW 8.3 9.1 7.8 3.4
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: ∗All figures are expressed as a percentage and rounded to the first
digit. Base data for computations are taken from Altamirano-Cabrera
and Finus (2006). #κm = size of coalition κm, POPi = population in region
i, GDPi = gross domestic product in region i.
countries (EEX), China (CHN), and India (IND) receive high shares since
these regions are highly populated. The ‘ability to pay’ rule allocates the
gains from cooperation inversely to welfare (measured as GDP) per capita
with more or less the same beneficiaries as under the transfer scheme
‘population’.
‘Ability to pay’ links development assistance to environmental policy.
Hence, developing countries can make a case that this scheme should be
applied as long as welfare is very unevenly distributed, as this is currently
the case. Moreover, part of the wealth of industrialized countries has been
built on high greenhouse gas emissions in the past, which are responsible for
the current stock of carbon. Hence, ecological justice warrants a high share of
the global gains from cooperation for developing countries and countries in
transition if industrialized countries want these countries joining a climate
agreement. This idea is even more powerfully reflected in the scheme
‘population’. From a pure ethical point of view, it appears that this scheme
is the most convincing one in favor of developing countries, as it does
not have to resort to the argument of development assistance. Moreover, it
seems very difficult to argue against the concept of ‘one man one vote’.
The last transfer scheme that we consider is ‘gross domestic product’,
which is based on the relative share per region in global GDP. It belongs
to the so-called sovereignty rules, because it more or less preserves the
current status quo of wealth. Hence, USA, Japan (JPN), and the European
Union (EU) receive high shares. The motivation of this transfer scheme is
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difficult to swallow for developing countries and runs against the idea of
linking climate policy to development assistance, as this has been stated by
the Framework Convention on Climate Change signed in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992. Nevertheless, as we will see, under this scheme transfers (though
moderate) flow from industrialized to developing countries and countries
in transition.
2.3 Features of the model
In this section, we briefly discuss some features of our model related to
payoff function (6) of which the proofs are provided in our working paper
(Finus et al., 2004).
1. Payoff function (6) implies superadditivity and positive externalities.
Superadditivity means that whenever coalitions, say, κ and κm merge,
so that the coalition structure changes from p to p˜, the aggregate
payoff to regions in κ ∪ κm increases,
∑
j∈κ vj (p) +
∑
j∈κm v j (p) <∑
j∈κ∪κm v j ( p˜). Since transfers balance, this is also true for any transfer
scheme that we consider in this paper. Positive externalities means that a
merger of coalition κ and κm raises valuations of outsiders k /∈ {κ ∪ κm},
vk(p) < vk( p˜), which also holds in the case of transfers.
2. Superadditivity together with positive externalities implies that global
welfare is raised through the merger of coalitions which may be
interpreted as increasing the ‘degree of cooperation’. Thus, cooperation
raises global welfare and every participant can be better off by using
an appropriate transfer scheme.
3. Generally, the advantage of participating in a coalition is that it increases
global abatement. This in turn increases benefits from abatement
but also increases abatement costs. The relative size of both effects
determines whether it pays to join a coalition or to free-ride. Generally,
the higher the degree of cooperation, the more attractive it becomes to
free-ride due to positive externalities. Therefore, full cooperation and
even substantial partial cooperation may be difficult to achieve. This is
illustrated in section 3.
3. Results
The computations described in section 2 lead to the results shown in
table 3 in the case of no transfers and in table 4 for the four different transfer
schemes.6 Only those coalition structures that are stable are listed, except for
the grey rows, which represent important benchmarks. Coalition structures
are displayed in a reduced form where only regions that are members of a
non-trivial coalition are listed; singleton regions have been omitted. For the
no transfer scenario, coalition structures are listed in descending order of
global welfare. This also applies to the transfer scenario where structures are
6 The matrices of valuations for the case of no transfers and the four transfer schemes
are available from the authors upon request. Computations of valuations as well
as stability have been carried out with an algorithm programmed in Fortran. See
Finus et al. (2004) for details.
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Table 3. Stable coalition structures in the case of no transfers∗
OM EM-MV EM-UV
Global
welfare
Global emission
reductionCoalition structure S M S M S M CO2-stock
grand coalition n n n n n n 18,838 31.9 1420.6
old Kyoto coalition: {USA,JPN,EU,OOE,EE,FSU} n n n n n n 9,987 13.6 1514.9
new Kyoto coalition: {JPN,EU,OOE,EE,FSU} n n n n n n 8,652 10.6 1530.5
{OOE,IND,BRA},{JPN,EU},{FSU,ROW},{EEX,CHN} – n – n – y 8,299 9.6 1535.4
{FSU,BRA,ROW}, {JPN,EU},{OOE,IND},{EEX,CHN} – n – n – y 8,296 9.6 1535.4
{OOE,IND,BRA},{JPN,EU},{CHN,DAE},{FSU,ROW} – n – n – y 8,183 9.5 1536.1
{FSU,BRA,ROW},{JPN,EU},{OOE,IND},{CHN,DAE} – n – n – y 8,179 9.5 1536.1
{FSU,BRA,ROW},{JPN,EU},{OOE,DAE},{EEX,IND} – n – n – y 7,710 9.0 1538.9
{OOE,IND,BRA}, {JPN,EU},{EEX,DAE},{FSU,ROW} – n – n – y 7,707 8.9 1539.0
{FSU,BRA,ROW}, {JPN,EU},{OOE,IND}{EEX,DAE} – n – n – y 7,703 8.9 1539.0
{FSU,BRA,ROW},{JPN,EU},{OOE,EEX},{IND,DAE} – n – n – y 7,693 8.9 1539.0
{EEX,CHN} n n n n y n 7,204 8.2 1542.6
{CHN,DAE} n n n n y n 7,088 8.1 1543.4
{FSU,BRA,ROW} n n y n y n 6,974 8.0 1543.9
all singletons n n n n n n 6,460 7.4 1547.1
Notes: ∗Abbreviations of regions as described in subsection 2.2. OM=open membership, EM-MV=exclusive membership majority
voting, EM-UV=exclusive membership unanimity voting, S=single coalition game and M=multiple. Global welfare expressed in
billion US dollar over 100 years, global emission reduction expressed in percentage from BAU-emissions, assuming BAU-emissions as
listed in column 2 in the table in the appendix over 100 years; CO2-stock in giga tons carbon in 2110; y = stable, n = not stable, – = not
defined.
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Table 4. Stable coalition structures in the case of transfers∗
OM EM-MV EM-UV
Global
welfare
Global emission
reductionCoalition structure S M S M S M CO2-stock
grand coalition n n n n n n 18,838 31.9 1420.6
old Kyoto coalition: {USA,JPN,EU,OOE,EE,FSU} n n n n n n 9,987 13.6 1514.9
new Kyoto coalition: {JPN,EU,OOE,EE,FSU} n n n n n n 8,652 10.6 1530.5
Transfer scheme gross domestic product
{USA,DAE,BRA},{JPN,EE},{EU,CHN},{OOE,EEX} – n – y – y 10,545 12.6 1520.1
{USA,CHN},{JPN,EE},{EU,DAE},{OOE,EEX} – n – y – y 10,453 12.5 1520.8
{USA,DAE},{JPN,EE},{EU,CHN},{OOE,EEX} – n – y – y 10,452 12.5 1520.8
{USA,OOE,EEX},{EU,DAE,BRA},{JPN,EE},{CHN,ROW} – n – y – y 9,696 11.4 1526.4
{USA,DAE,BRA},{EU,OOE,EEX},{JPN,EE},{CHN,ROW} – n – y – y 9,661 11.3 1526.7
{USA,OOE,EEX},{EU,DAE}{JPN,EE},{CHN,ROW} – n – y – y 9,631 11.3 1526.9
{USA,DAE},{JPN,EE},{EU,OOE,EEX},{CHN,ROW} – n – y – y 9,568 11.2 1527.4
{EU,CHN} y n y n y n 9,476 11.3 1526.9
Transfer scheme population
{USA,EU},{OOE,FSU},{EE,ROW},{CHN,IND} – n – y – y 9,001 10.7 1529.7
{EEX,CHN} y n y n y n 7,204 8.2 1542.6
Transfer scheme equal sharing
{EE,CHN,IND} y n y n y n 8,124 9.3 1537
Transfer scheme ability to pay
{CHN,IND} y n y n y n 7,626 8.7 1540
{USA,OOE} n n y n y n 6,900 7.9 1544.2
{EU,OOE} n n y n y n 6,840 7.8 1544.6
{JPN,OOE} n n y n y n 6,748 7.7 1545.3
all singletons n n n n n n 6,460 7.4 1547.1
Note: ∗Transfer rules as described in section 2.2. For notation, see table 3.
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listed for each transfer scheme. From the tables the following conclusions
can be drawn.
3.1 Gains from cooperation
The possible global gains from cooperation are large in absolute but also
in relative terms. Global welfare (defined as the net benefits of climate
policies) in the coalition structure ‘grand coalition’ (full cooperation) is three
times larger than in the coalition structure ‘all singletons’ (no cooperation).
The ‘old Kyoto’ coalition, which comprises all Annex-B regions before the
USA withdrew from the Protocol, could close the gap between full and
no cooperation by a substantial amount, but is far from being globally
optimal. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the ‘new Kyoto’ coalition
that misses the USA and therefore yields a lower global welfare than
the old Kyoto coalition. However, the old and new Kyoto coalition as
well as the grand coalition are not stable, regardless of the treaty design
that we consider in this paper. The most successful coalition structure
is the first listed in table 4 under the transfer scheme ‘gross domestic
product’. This coalition structure emerges if regions can form multiple
coalitions and if membership is exclusive. The reason why this institutional
setting is conducive to successful cooperation will be taken up below
under the heading of ‘transfers’, ‘membership rule’, and ‘multiple coalition
structures’.
It is interesting to note that in our model the CO2-stock in the global
optimum (1475.1) in 2110, measured in giga tons carbon, translates into a
CO2-concentration of 669 ppmv (parts per million volumn). This is in line
with for instance Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), who compute with their
CGE-model 644 ppmv in 2100. Our numbers are also in line with the policy
scenarios considered in the fourth IPCC report (IPCC, 2007) in which targets
for climate stabilization range from 350 ppmv to 790 ppmv, translating into
an increase of global mean temperature between 2 and 6 degrees celsius.
3.2 Participation
From the number of participants, success of cooperation cannot be inferred.
For instance, the coalition structure that comprises only one coalition
including the European Union (EU) and China (CHN) (see table 4,
last coalition structure listed under the transfer scheme ‘gross domestic
product’) implies a larger global welfare than that obtained under many
other coalition structures with more coalitions and a higher number of
participants as listed under the transfer scheme ‘population’ in table 4, and
under no transfers in table 3.
Tables 3 and 4 stress the key role of CHN and USA, as well as India (IND)
and ROW for successful cooperation because of their relatively flat marginal
abatement cost curve compared to other regions. For instance, in table 3,
there are eight multiple coalition structures (displayed in descending order
of global welfare) of which the first four include CHN as a coalition member.
Also in table 4 under the transfer scheme ‘ability to pay’, three coalitions
that do not include CHN as a member yield a lower global welfare than
the first listed coalition between CHN and IND. In table 4, all multiple
coalition structures under the transfer scheme ‘gross domestic product’,
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which include the USA, yield a higher global welfare than those listed
under no transfers without the USA. However, regions like the EU and JPN
are also important as they receive high marginal benefits from cooperation.
This calls for high abatement targets (given the assumption of joint welfare
maximization; see equation (2)) which is beneficial to all due to positive
externalities.
3.3 Transfers
Transfers do make a difference. Many stable coalition structures listed in
table 4 generate a higher global welfare, which is particularly true for the
transfer scheme ‘gross domestic product’, than those in table 3. The intuition
is as follows.
Firstly, the very different structure of both costs and benefits for the
regions implies for most coalition structures also a very asymmetric
distribution of the gains from cooperation if no transfers are applied.
This implies that for some members cooperation would not be profitable
(measured against the benchmark no cooperation).7 In contrast, all transfer
schemes ensure at least profitability.
Secondly, heterogeneity may also cause internal stability to be violated for
coalitions with ‘mixed membership’, i.e. coalitions between industrialized
and developing countries or countries in transition. On the one hand, it is not
attractive for a region with a relatively flat marginal abatement cost curve
and low marginal benefits (type 1 regions) to cooperate with other regions
because it contributes much to cooperation but benefits only little. Examples
include CHN, IND, and ROW. On the other hand, it is not attractive for a
region to cooperate with a region that has high marginal benefits and a
steep marginal abatement cost curve (type 2 regions) because this implies
a high abatement target for the coalition to which type 2 regions contribute
only little. Examples include EU and JPN.
Hence, if there are no transfers, coalitions do not comprise of mixed
membership (see table 3). Moreover, no stable coalition includes USA. In
contrast, if there are transfers, USA is a frequent partner in stable coalitions
(see table 4). Moreover, mixed membership is possible, depending on the
transfer scheme, including the key players USA, CHN, ROW, EU, and
JPN. The scheme ‘gross domestic product’ is clearly superior compared to
the other three transfer schemes because it ensures mixed membership. It
implies modest transfers from industrialized to other countries. In contrast,
the three other transfer schemes imply large transfers. This de facto replaces
the asymmetry without transfers with another asymmetry which is more
or less reversed, but also not helpful for successful coalition formation.
3.4 Membership rule
The membership rule has a crucial impact on stability and success of
cooperation. This is particularly pronounced in the case of no transfers
7 Note that profitability is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for internal
stability in the context of positive externalities. Moreover, internal stability is a
necessary condition for stability in a single and multiple coalition game, regardless
whether open or exclusive membership is assumed.
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where stable coalition structures only emerge under exclusive membership
with unanimity voting (table 3). In the case of transfers, this difference is less
pronounced (table 4). Nevertheless, many of the coalition structures with
high global welfare are only stable under exclusive membership, though
majority voting is sufficient to stabilize these coalition structures.
3.5 Multiple coalition structures
Provided coalition formation is not restricted to a single coalition, coalition
structures with multiple coalitions frequently emerge in equilibrium.
Multiple coalitions are superior to single coalitions in terms of global
welfare. The advantage of multiple coalitions is particularly pronounced
in the case of no transfer (table 3) and under the transfer scheme ‘gross
domestic product’ (table 4). Only in the case of the transfer schemes ‘equal
sharing’ and ‘ability to pay’ (table 4) is there no coalition structure stable
when multiple coalitions can be formed. However, some coalition structures
are stable if coalition formation is restricted to a single coalition.
4. Summary, conclusions, and extensions
We analyzed coalition formation in the context of global warming. The
analysis was based on the stability of coalitions model, STACO, that
provides benefit and cost estimates of 12 world regions. We considered
several agreement designs: single versus multiple coalitions, open versus
exclusive membership with either majority or unanimity voting, and no
transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes. A wider
interpretation of our results allows for the following conclusions.
1. The gains from cooperation as computed by our model are large in
absolute and relative terms, which suggests that the lack of cooperation
is a serious problem in the context of climate change. The conjecture
that a high participation means success is misleading. More important
is the inclusion of key players, which in our model are China, USA,
India, and ROW due to their flat marginal abatement cost curves, as
well as EU and Japan due their high marginal benefits.
2. The effort to get as many countries as possible into one ‘climate boat’
may not be the best strategy in the presence of free-rider incentives.
Allowing for separate agreements among regions that have similar
interests may foster the success of international agreements. In this
light, the position of the USA only to ratify the Kyoto Protocol if
developing countries will also join the protocol and take on climate
responsibility is open to criticism.8 However, their announcement in
the aftermaths of their withdrawal that they would pursue their own
climate policy cooperating with countries of similar interests may
be evaluated positively. At least as an intermediate step, multiple
agreements may be useful on the way to a global treaty, as this
8 In 1997, the US Senate unanimously passed the Byrd–Hagel resolution, which
makes ‘meaningful’ participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for
ratification (The Byrd–Hagel Resolution, US Senate, 12 June 1997, 105th Congress,
1st Session, Senate Resolution 98).
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is often the case with regional trade agreements that lead to more
comprehensive agreements at later stages. For the design of post-Kyoto
agreements, one possibility would be that developing countries and
countries in transition form their own treaty as long as industrialized
countries are not prepared to provide enough compensation for
these countries to join a single treaty.
3. Certainly, club good agreements (e.g. NATO, European Union, and
WTO) may enjoy a higher stability and success than public good
agreements, like international environmental agreements, because
the benefits from contributions are exclusive to members. However,
another reason may be that accession is limited through majority or
unanimity voting. Hence, the open membership rule as applied in
almost every international environmental treaty should not be taken
for granted.
4. Transfers can foster the success of cooperation if actors have asymmetric
benefit–cost structures. They can be used to induce participation
of regions with cheap abatement options that perceive the benefits
from climate policy to be rather low, which is typical for developing
countries and countries in transition, together with industrialized
countries, which push for high ambitious abatement targets. However,
balancing interests between heterogeneous regions is not an easy
task. In our setting, it turned out that transfer schemes motivated
by some notion of equity are not the most effective for climate
policy (measured by the global welfare gain from cooperation). This
suggests the importance of also including the stability dimension in the
literature on fair sharing, which so far only considered distributional
issues.
For future research, we think that three issues (which are underlined in
table 1) may be particularly fruitful.
1. Our approach assumed a simultaneous coalition formation process,
though in reality signature and ratification of IEAs usually take place
sequentially. The sequential move unanimity game of Bloch (1996)
could certainly be a starting point for such an alternative approach,
though it seems that conceptual modifications are needed in order
to capture what is really going on in negotiations leading to an IEA.
Preliminary results from a stylized model with symmetric players in
Finus and Rundshagen (2006) suggest that a sequential process adds
another strategic dimension, making successful coalition formation
even more difficult due to free-riding.
2. Though the assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalitions
(which may be interpreted as a first-best design) is frequently made in
the literature, casual empirical evidence suggests that governments do
not follow this rule when negotiating abatement targets. Abatement
allocation is often not cost-effective and the aggregate level is not
optimal from a global point of view (i.e. second-best designs). An
alternative approach could model negotiations as a non-cooperative
bargaining game over emission reductions, capturing also the political
decision process within countries.
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Preliminary results that consider a departure from cost-effectiveness
and lower coalitional abatement targets in a simple bargaining model
suggest that this may well pay from a global point of view (Altamirano-
Cabrera et al., 2008). Second-best designs lead to large stable coalitions
that are more successful than small stable coalitions with first-best
design. Whether this applies to coalition structures with multiple
coalitions remains to be investigated.
3. In line with the literature, we considered several transfer schemes
that are related to sharing rules of cooperative game theory. Also
in line with the literature, we found that the success depends on
the sharing schemes. However, no information is available on other
transfer schemes that could yield even more successful stable coalition
structures, let alone which transfer scheme would be optimal. By
optimal we mean a transfer scheme that stabilizes the coalition
structure that generates the largest global welfare among those coalition
structures that can be potentially stabilized. For coalition structures
with a single coalition, Eyckmans and Finus (2004) and Weikard
(2005) have independently shown that such a transfer scheme can
be constructed, which is illustrated in Carraro et al. (2006). The main
problem is to extend this concept to the context of coalition structures
with multiple coalitions, which, as we have seen, are often more
successful than single coalitions. The main problem is that for multiple
coalitions not only internal and external but also intercoalitional
stability must be considered where there may be a trade-off between
these three dimensions of stability.
Finally, we would like to mention two limitations of our model, which
may be taken up in future research.
1. In our model, the incentives for coalition formation are exclusively
restricted to costs and benefits from greenhouse gas reduction. On the
one hand, this means that equity can only work through the channel of
the redistribution of the gains from cooperation via transfers. However,
apart from this ‘material payoff’, equity per se may be part of the utility
function of agents in the form of ‘non-material’ payoffs. Results from
stylized models with symmetric players and a single coalition in Lange
and Vogt (2003), and Peters and Schuler (2006), suggest that equity
can be conducive to the success of coalition formation. On the other
hand, the literature on issue linkage – initiated by Folmer et al. (1993)
– suggests that not only monetary transfers but also concessions in
other policy issues (e.g. trade, research, and development) can help to
balance interests between heterogeneous regions.
It appears that both extensions could do more justice to the role of
developing countries and countries in transition for climate change
than our analysis. In particular, the discussion of fairness and the link
between climate change and development assistance in the form of
technology transfers could be analyzed more appropriately.
2. Results of empirical models always depend on the assumption of
parameter values. Of course, changes in assumptions will affect
quantitative results. However, more important is the question whether
18 Michael Finus et al.
they will also affect our qualitative conclusions. In our model, it turns
out that qualitative results will not be affected by a change of the
global benefit parameter b in the payoff function (6). As mentioned
in subsection 2.2, the value in the original calculations in STACO
was assumed to be 37.4 US$ per ton carbon, which we updated
to 77 US$.9 With qualitative conclusions we mean all our results
in section 3 and the interpretations derived in section 4 concerning
‘gains from cooperation’, ‘participation’, ‘transfers’, ‘membership rule’,
and ‘multiple coalition structures’. Even the composition of stable
coalition structures hardly changes. Quantitative results change insofar
as equilibrium abatement levels as well global welfare in a given
coalition structure are now higher. For instance in the grand coalition,
discounted global welfare is 18,838 billion US$ and global emission
reduction is 31.9 per cent for b=77 US$ (see tables 3 and 4), whereas
for b=37.4 US$ this is 6,031 billion US$ and 21.4 per cent, respectively.
However, the relative gains from cooperation measured against the
benchmark of no cooperation remain almost the same.
Due to the simple structure of STACO, a similar effect (i.e. an
increase of the benefit parameter b) could be observed by lowering
the discount rate or lowering abatement costs uniformly as explained
in Weikard et al. (2006). The former effect could be due to a change of
the time preference rate, the latter effect could be due to technological
innovation.
There is also some indication that the main qualitative results are
unaffected if regional parameters are changed, though membership
in coalitions will certainly change (e.g. Finus et al., 2005). In STACO
this concerns the regional benefit parameter γi and the regional cost
parameter αi and βi . As the analysis of stable coalition structures
depends, even in our simple model, on so many different forces,
predictions are difficult. However, we may expect that if the regional
benefit parameter γi of say China increased due to more environmental
pressure, this would increase the incentive of this country to participate
in a climate treaty with industrialized countries. That is, in future
China’s incentive structure may resemble more that of industrialized
countries. This effect may be reinforced if we assume that – despite
technological innovations – her abatement cost increases as BAU-
emissions increase dramatically due to fast economic development.
In order to treat these uncertain changes systematically over time,
two major changes of our model would be required. Firstly, we would
need a truly dynamic model of the CGE type, which also includes
endogenous growth of emissions and technological innovation.
Moreover, stability would have to be tested at each point in time along
the entire time path. Secondly, since all changes are uncertain by their
very nature, a systematic analysis of uncertainty would be necessary.
However, this is beyond the scope of the present paper – considering
that currently only few CGE-models with endogenous technological
change are around (e.g. Buonanno et al., 2003), so far dynamic stability
9 Computations for b=37.4 US$ are conducted in our working paper (Finus et al.,
2004).
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of coalitions has only been treated in very simple stylized models (e.g.
Rubio and Ulph, 2007) and a systematic analysis of uncertainty has
only been developed for single coalitions (e.g. Dellink et al., 2008).
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Appendix: Emissions, benefit and abatement cost parameters∗
BAU-emissions
in 2010
Share of global
benefits
parameter
Abatement cost
parameter
Abatement cost
parameter
Regions γi αi βi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 (USA) 2.42 0.226 0.0005 0.00398
2 (JPN) 0.56 0.173 0.0155 0.18160
3 (EU) 1.4 0.236 0.0024 0.01503
4 (OOE) 0.62 0.035 0.0083 0
5 (EE) 0.51 0.013 0.0079 0.00486
6 (FSU) 1 0.068 0.0023 0.00042
7 (EEX) 1.22 0.030 0.0032 0.03029
8 (CHN) 2.36 0.062 0.00007 0.00239
9 (IND) 0.63 0.050 0.0015 0.00787
10 (DAE) 0.41 0.025 0.0047 0.03774
11 (BRA) 0.13 0.015 0.5612 0.84974
12 (ROW) 0.7 0.068 0.0021 0.00805
World 11.96 1 – –
Notes: ∗Input data in STACO-model as described in Finus et al. (2005). BAU-
Emissions are emissions in the business-as-usual scenario measured in giga
tons carbon.
